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Afghanistan Situation Report

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2 April 1985

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
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT	25X1
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Insurgent supplies are increasing and the Pakistani Government probably is distributing goods directly to some commanders.	25X1
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Afghan and Soviet officials are doing little to halt the opium trade and may be promoting drug production, trafficking, and use.	25X1
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The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution during 1979 added a new dimension to the historically troublesome Iranian-Afghan border area. Ongoing quarrels over water rights are now complicated by Afghan insurgents operating along the border, Afghan refugees in Iran, and insurgent supply routes from Iran.	25X1 25X1
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This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues raised in the publication should be	
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RESUPPLYING THE INSURGENTS	25X
Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Peshawar-based leader of the Jamiat-i-Islami insurgent organization, claimed in	
early March that his supplies of military and support equipmentincluding boots and clothinghave recently	;
increased. He claims that the aid is provided by	
"Arabs" and distributed by the Pakistani Government.	25 X
	25^
Comment:	25X
	25X
Improvement in the insurgents' military supplies and	
training probably will enable the guerrillas to	
intensify attacks against Soviet and regime targets this spring. Direct supply of selected insurgent	
groups by the Pakistani Government will assuage the	
feelings of some resistance commanders who have become irritated with delays experienced in dealing through	
Peshawar resistance organizations. The insurgents,	
however, probably will find resupplying their forces in Afghanistan more difficult this spring as the Soviets	
increase their <u>efforts to stop insurg</u> ent infiltration.	25X
	207
NARCOTICS ACTIVITY IN AFGHANISTAN	25X
Afghan and Soviet officials continue to make little effort to halt the opium trade and may even be	
promoting drug production, trafficking, and use,	ı
despite Moscow's expressed concern over drug use and trafficking by Soviet conscripts. Although there have	
been sporadic Afghan regime attempts to organize	
enforcement effortsa year ago rumors circulated in Kabul that the Government was offering opium growers 10	•
percent more than the market price	25X
	25 X
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			25X
	coun muja move	nent: Given the regime's lack of control in the tryside and preoccupation with fighting the hedin, Afghan and Soviet officials are unlikely to against opium cultivation and trafficking in a ous way any time soon.	25)
IN I	BRIEF		,
		Kabul radio announced on 31 March that insurgents had killed former Andarab Valley guerrilla commander Juma Khan. A one-time member of Hizbi IslamiGulbuddin faction, Juma Khan defected with his band to the government in fall 1984 and was instrumental in blocking Panjsher Valley insurgents' supply lines and access to their rear base at Khost-e Fereng.	25) 25)
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PERSPECTIVE

THE IRANIAN-AFGHAN BORDER:	A HISTORY OF DISPUTES	

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution during 1979 added a new dimension to the problems in the historically troublesome Iranian-Afghan border area. More than 300,000 Afghan refugees, many of them ethnically similar to peoples living in the Iranian border area, probably have fled to Iran. reportedly return to Afghanistan periodically to fight--or farm. Afghan resistance groups are active in western Afghanistan, with some using Iran as a sanctuary, and some maintaining offices in Iran. Supply routes for groups fighting in western Afghanistan traverse Iran. Insurgent caravans most frequently cross the border in the south in the Sistan Basin area or in the north, to the west of Herat City.

Border Basics

The 900-kilometer-long Iranian-Afghan border, extending roughly along a north-south axis between the Soviet Union and Pakistan, is easily crossed. Border terrain varies from relatively low hills and mountains to huge salt flats, brackish lakes and marshes, and sandy or rocky plains. No dominant physical feature marks the border area; the boundary is defined by small streams, minor water divides, and ridges interspersed with straight-line segments. Access to water, the primary cause of past disputes, was a key factor used to determine the boundary alignment. The border area is sparsely populated by Persians, Pushtuns, Tajiks, Baluchis, and smaller ethnic groups.

Establishing the Border

The Iranian-Afghan border was the subject of deliberations by four arbitration commissions between 1872 and 1935, with the southern section of the boundary the first to be addressed. Both Persian and Afghan groups pressed claims for use of the Helmand River waters that empty into a large basin of semipermanent lakes and marshes. Disputes over the

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territory served by the waters where grazing and agriculture flourished eventually led to a request for arbitration. In 1872, British Major General Goldsmid headed a commission that divided the basin, known in Iran as the Sistan. The commission award allocated access to irrigation points and canals and included a key provision that neither side should construct "works" to interfere with the other's water supplies. The commission, however, did not survey and neither delimited nor demarcated the border between the countries. Both sides were displeased with the award, but the British forced them to accept it.	, 25X1
A short stretch of the northern section of the boundary was settled by terms of an award in 1890 drawn by another British officer, Major General MacLean. Both Iran and Afghanistan claimed a small basin that had once been cultivated but had been abandoned. A compromise solution was accepted by both sides and a detailed description of the placement of 39 boundary markers was made. The remainder of the northern section of the boundary follows the Hari Rud, a major Afghan river that flows north into the Soviet Union.	25X1
The dispute over water use in the southern section of the boundary arose again in the early 1900s because of a change in a channel of the Helmand River's delta and a severe drought. The British responded to a call for arbitration in 1902 by sending a large commission headed by Colonel McMahon. The commission was instructed to follow the earlier rulings of the Goldsmid commission with McMahon to interpret the language of the agreement compared to more recent, detailed topographic maps of the area. Boundary markers were then described in text and placed in the ground. The award also clarified and refined language used to define the amount of water to be made legally available to Iran.	25 X 1
The central section of the boundary was defined in 1935 after a minor dispute had arisen over an area adjoining a section of boundary demarcated earlier. A commission headed by a Turkish officer, General Altai, produced a compromise calling for some 38 pillars to be erected to demarcate the remaining 400 km of the border.	25X1
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U.S.S.R. MACLEAN AWARD 1888-91 **IRAN-AFGHANISTAN BOUNDARY** _oHērat Present boundary Selected boundary pillar Other international boundary 50 75 Miles 25 50 75 Kilometers TURKISH DELIMITATION AND DEMARCATION 15 MAY 1935 AFGHANISTAN IRAN U.S.S.R. AF G H , ∟ Hāmūn-e BP 77 Saberi IRAN Daryacheh ye_Sistan PAKISTAN Basin INDIA MCMAHON AWARD 1903-05 ARABIAN SEA Source of Data: Office of the Geographer, Department of State Dam Gelmand Construction **PAKISTAN** 62

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Recent Water Concerns A bilateral water-sharing treaty, signed in 1973 and ratified in 1977, was intended to end decades of bickering. But in 1979 when the Afghans announced development plans calling for a new dam 70 km upstream from the border, the Iranians objected. Preliminary work was halted in 1980 shortly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A resumption of construction would likely again cause political reverberations in Iran because a completed dam would significantly disrupt downstream hydrology. Though water supplies guaranteed by the treaty signed in 1977 would not be affected, the possibility of Iran gaining additional water supplies would be foreclosed.
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